Western New England Law Review
Volume 30 30 (2007-2008)
Issue 1 SYMPOSIUM: CURRENT ISSUES IN
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Article 9

1-1-2007

FRINGE BANKERS: ECONOMIC
PREDATORS OR A NEW FINANCIAL
SERVICES MODEL?
Jean A. Fox

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Jean A. Fox, FRINGE BANKERS: ECONOMIC PREDATORS OR A NEW FINANCIAL SERVICES MODEL?, 30 W. New Eng. L.
Rev. 135 (2007), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss1/9

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New
England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

FRINGE BANKERS: ECONOMIC PREDATORS
OR A NEW FINANCIAL SERVICES MODEL?
JEAN ANN

Fox*

Cash-strapped families are bombarded with easy credit offers
and costly fee-based financial services. Un banked and marginally
banked consumers pay steep fees at check-cashing outlets to perform
basic financial transactions, such as cashing checks, paying bills, or
wiring funds. Payday and car title loans charge triple-digit interest
rates and place important assets at risk if short-term loans cannot be
quickly repaid. Tax-refund loans skim hundreds of millions in anti
poverty dollars from tax refunds and Earned Income Tax Credits,
from the working poor. Consumer protections are inadequate in
most states and resources to assist families and to improve communi
ties are siphoned out of low- and moderate-income neighborhoods
by fringe "bankers."
INTRODUCTION

Storefront fee-for-service financial providers are attempting to
move into the mainstream through public relations campaigns and
image advertising, using updated store design and marketing
pitched to a broader range of consumers. Typically, their products
and services charge high fees and astronomical interest rates, en
dangering valuable assets. Consumers who can least afford to pay
for high-cost, high-risk financial products are the most likely to use
them. Fringe financial transactions impede asset development and
trap borrowers in cycles of debt.
A two-tiered financial services market results, in part, from
gaps in consumer protections. As long as state and federal govern
ments fail to regulate check cashers and quick-cash lenders, and fail
* The author is the Director of Consumer Protection for Consumer Federation
of America, a nonprofit consumer advocacy organization based in Washington DC. She
is an author and coauthor of numerous reports on payday lending, car title lending,
refund anticipation loans, bank overdraft loans and bounced check fees, and check
cashing. See Consumer Fed'n of Am., http://www.consumerfed.org (last visited June 28,
2007); Payday Loan Consumer Information, http://www.paydayloaninfo.org (last visited
June 28, 2007).
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to enforce usury laws or prohibit rate gouging, fringe bankers will
continue to be "economic predators" rather than providers of a
"new financial services model."
I.

FRINGE BANKING FINANCIAL PRODUCTS

Fringe financial products include both transaction services and
small loans secured by bank accounts, car titles, tax refunds, and
federal antipoverty benefits. Rent-to-own stores that purport to
"lease" household goods, electronics, and jewelry are a form of
high-cost retail installment sales but are not dealt with in this Essay.
A.

Payday Loans

Payday loans, also called deferred deposit loans, are short-term
cash advances based on the borrower's personal check or debit au
thorization held for future deposit. These loans are made at payday
loan outlets, check cashers, rent-to-own stores, pawn shops, or via
the Internet. As of 2006, there were approximately 25,000 payday
loan outlets, making over $28 billion in loans at a cost to consumers
of almost $5 billion. 1 A 2006 Consumer Federation of America
(CFA) survey of check cashers found that in the states that author
ize payday loans, two-thirds of the cash-change stores also make
payday loans. 2
To get a payday loan, a borrower must have a bank account,
identification, and a source of income, but is not required to
demonstrate an ability to repay or possession of sound credit.
Loans are typically for a few hundred up to a thousand dollars and
are due in full on the borrower's next payday. If the loan is not
repaid in person, the check used to secure the loan will be depos
ited and, if sufficient funds are not available, will trigger bounced
check fees from both the payday lender and the borrower's bank.
Payday loans are extremely expensive, with a $300 loan costing be
1. URIAH KING, LESLIE PARRISH & OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, FINANCIAL QUICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS IN DEBT
WITH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 17 (2006), available at http://
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rrOI2-Financial_Quicksand-II06.pdf.
2. JEAN ANN Fox & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., CASHED
OUT: CONSUMERS PAY STEEP PREMIUM TO "BANK" AT CHECK CASHING OUTLETS 2
(2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_2006_Check_ Cashin~Study
111506.pdf.
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tween $45 and $90 for a two-week term, which translates to 390%
to 780% annual interest rate. 3
B.

Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs)

Quick tax loans issued by banks during tax season are princi
pally marketed by commercial tax preparers to the working poor.
Loans are secured by anticipated tax refunds, often including feder
ally funded antipoverty tax credits. The average RAL is about
$2500 and is repaid in less than two weeks when the IRS direct
deposits the borrower's tax refund to an account at the bank that
extended the loan.4 According to a 2007 report by the National
Consumer Law Center and the CFA, there were 9.6 million RALs
in the 2005 tax-filing season, down from 12.38 million in 2004. 5 Tax
payers paid $960 million in RAL fees in 2005, plus extra fees, for a
total cost of over $1 billion. 6 The cost of borrowing against ex
pected tax refunds amounts to an annual percentage rate (APR)
ranging from 40% to 500%.7 The average $2500 loan results in an
APR ranging from 85% to 170%, depending on the lender. 8
RALs are made by a few banks including HSBC, Santa Bar
bara. Bank & Trust, JP Morgan Chase, and Republic Bank & Trust
through tax preparers H&R Block, Jackson Hewitt, and Liberty
Tax Service, as well as at storefront fringe financial service compa
nies, retailers, and car dealers.
C.

Car TitLe Loans

Car title loans provide quick cash secured by the title to a vehi
cle owned free and clear by the borrower. Loans are typically due
in one month but can be extended by paying only the finance
charge. Title loans are legal in about half of the states. 9 A national
3. For more information on payday lending see Payday Loan Consumer Informa
tion, Facts, http://www.paydayloaninfo.orglfacts.cfm.
4. CHI CHI Wu & JEAN ANN Fox, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & CONSUMER
FED'N OF AM., ONE STEP FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: PROGRESS SEEN IN EFFORTS
AGAINST HIGH-PRICED REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS, BUT EVEN MORE ABUSIVE
PRODUCTS INTRODUCED 4-5 (2007), available at http://www.consumerlaw.orglissues/
refund_anticipation/content/2007_RAL_Report.pdf.
5. Id. at I.
6. Id. at 5-6.
7. [d. at II.
8. /d. at 2.
9. JEAN ANN Fox & ELIZABETH GUY, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., DRIVEN INTO
DEBT: CFA CAR TITLE LOAN STORE AND ONLINE SURVEY 5-6 (2005), available at
http://www.consumerfed.orglpdfs/Car_11 tJe_Loan_ReporCl11705. pdf.
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survey of title lenders in 2005 found that the average loan comes
with costs amounting to 300% APR.1° There are no national statis
tics on the size of this business, but the Tennessee Department of
Financial Institutions reported $40 million in outstanding accounts
receivable at title lenders in that state on June 30, 2006, with 206
companies at 645 locations extending 92,489 loans.1 1 The majority
of title loans in Tennessee were for $500 or less. 12
D.

Check Cashing

Retail outlets in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods
function as fee-for-service financial supermarkets. Check-cashing
outlets cash more than 180 million checks worth more than $55 bil
lion annually, according to the industry.1 3 Consumers pay a per
centage of the face value of checks to get them cashed. 14 A
national survey conducted by the CFA in 2006 found that the aver
age fee to cash government benefit checks was 2.44%.1 5 The aver
age fee to cash a hand-written payroll check was 4.11 % or $19.66 to
cash a weekly $478.41 hand-written paycheck for blue-collar work
ers.16 A lower fee of 2.52% is typically charged to cash computer
generated paychecks but fees can reach as high as 5 % of each
paycheckP
Some check-cashing outlets also sell prepaid debit cards as ex
pensive bank account substitutes. IS The average prepaid debit card
costs $10.86 plus monthly or weekly fees totaling approximately $5
per month. 19 Most outlets also charge a fee to load money onto the
card ($3.09 on average).20 Half of surveyed check cashers impose a
charge every time the card is used,21 not counting fees charged for
using the cards at automated teller machines.
10. Id. at 2.
11. TENN. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE INDUSTRY: A
SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2006 REPORT TO THE TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 7 (2007)
[hereinafter REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE INDUSTRY], available at http://www.
tennessee.gov/tdfi/complianceITPLSupplementaIReport-FlNAL.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Fox & WOODALL, supra note 2, at 4.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 6.
16. /d. at 6-7.
17. Id. at 6.
18. See generally id. at 10.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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II.

RISKS TO CONSUMERS AND COMMUNITIES FROM
FRINGE BANKING

Consumers who rely on fringe bankers for routine financial
services risk more than the high fees charged to borrow money,
cash checks, or load money onto prepaid cards. Payday loan bor
rowers are at great risk of becoming mired in a debt trap due to the
combination of check holding, extremely high cost, short repayment
terms, and lending without determining the borrower's ability to
repay. Simply put, most payday loan borrowers cannot afford to
repay the loan in full out of the next paycheck and still have enough
money left to make it to the next paycheck without borrowing
again. The average borrower has eight to nine loans per year from
a single lender. 22
Failure to repay or renew a payday loan puts the borrower at
risk of losing bank account or check-writing privileges. Every pay
day loan involves a personal check or debit authorization unlikely
to be covered by funds on deposit when the loan is made. Borrow
ers are sometimes threatened with adverse action for failure to
make good on the check. Some lenders repeatedly attempt to col
lect on electronic debits, triggering multiple insufficient funds fees
from both the borrower's bank and the payday lender. Lenders
also sue for nonpayment.
RALs are bank loans that require taxpayers to immediately re
pay the bank out of current funds, even if the tax refund expected
to repay the loan is denied or less than the loaned amount. Con
sumers who get RALs run the risk of cross-lender debt collection, a
unique risk for borrowers. Many RAL contracts include an agree
ment that permits any bank claiming an unpaid RAL from a prior
year to be paid out of the following year's tax refund when a con
sumer applies for a loan. Consumers who have their taxes prepared
at a retailer or car dealership can get a RAL to use as a down pay
ment on a big-ticket purchase. If another bank has already claimed
this year's refund to pay a prior RAL debt or if the IRS disallows
part or all of the anticipated refund, the consumer who used the
RAL as a down payment is still responsible for the purchase.
22.
2006

BUREAU OF FIN. INSTS., STATE CORP. COMM'N, COMMONWEALTH OF V A.,

ANNUAL REPORT: P A YDAY LENDER LICENSEES AND CHECK CASHERS OPERAT·

ING IN VIRGINIA AT THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS DECEMBER

31, 2006, at 7 (2007), available
KING, PARRISH &

at http://scc.virginia.gov/divisionlbankinglforms/ar04-06.pdf; see also
TANIK, supra note 1, at 7.
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Consumers who pledge car titles as security for small loans run
the risk of losing their vehicle. For example, Tennessee regulators
reported that 10,933 vehicles were repossessed for nonpayment in
2005 out of a total 92,489 loan agreements. 23 If every Tennessee
borrower renews a loan just three times, that is a 35% repossession
rate. If every loan is renewed seven times, as indicated by an ear
lier Tennessee Department of Financial Institutions report, more
than half of the cars pledged for loans are eventually lost by bor
rowers.24 Since these cars provide vital transportation and are
often the borrower's most valuable asset, securing small loans with
the title to the family vehicle is extremely risky.
"Banking" at a check casher instead of at an insured deposi
tory institution adds risk to consumers as well. Instead of keeping
money in an insured account, check-cashing patrons carry cash un
less they pay to load check proceeds onto a high-fee card or pay for
a money order to hold cash. Without a bank account it is more
difficult to build savings, adhere to a budget, and keep track of ex
penditures. Consumers may pay for electronic bill-pay services and
wire transfers, or buy money orders to make distant payments. Pre
paid debit cards purchased at financial services stores as bank ac
count replacements may not be covered by the federal protections
for debit cards tied to a checking account, including federal deposit
insurance.
An inherent risk in all fringe credit products is that users do
not build the positive credit rating needed to qualify for lower-cost
financial services in the future. Most fringe financial services prov
iders do not report successful payment to mainstream credit bu
reaus. Payday and other lenders use specialty reporting services
such as TeleTrack to screen applicants,25 but this does not result in
an improved credit score for successful payment. Fledgling efforts
to build thin credit files through fringe loan reporting raise ques
tions of whether payday loan payment-reporting adds to or detracts
from scores.

23.
24.
25.

REPORT ON THE TITLE PLEDGE INDUSTRY, supra note 11, at 7.

See generally id.
Teletrack, http://www.teletrack.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
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III.

VULNERABLE CONSUMERS USE FRINGE
BANKING SERVICES 26

Consumers who "bank" in the fringe financial market pay
steep fees to conduct routine transactions and can hardly afford the
out-of-pocket expense involved or the risk of losing a valuable
asset.
A.

Payday Loans

Despite industry claims to the contrary, most payday loan con
sumers earn low or moderate incomes and are often minorities.
The Colorado Office of the Administrator of the Uniform Con
sumer Credit Code collected a sample of customer records at super
vised payday lenders during four years of inspectionsP The
Colorado study found that the typical payday loan customer "is a
thirty-six-year-old single woman, making $2,370 per month."28
"Consumers earning less than $2,500 per month [($30,000 per year)
make up] nearly two-thirds ... of all [Colorado] borrowers."29 Al
most two-thirds of all Colorado borrowers "occupy the lowest three
income occupations" of laborer, office worker, or benefit recipi
ent. 30 Additionally, although military service members represent
approximately 1 % of Colorado's adult population, they constitute
over 4% of those who borrow from payday loan outlets in that
state. 3 !
Payday loan customers are more likely to be minorities.
[A] 2001 survey of low-income families in Charlotte (North Car
olina[ ] ... ) estimated that African Americans were about twice
as likely to have borrowed from a payday lender in a two-year
26. This section contains excerpts from CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., TESTIMONY OF
JEAN ANN Fox: DIRECfOR OF CONSUMER PROTEcrION BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON DOMESTIC POLICY OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND DOMESTIC
REFORM (2007), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/PDL_Kucinich_
Hearin~Testimony032107.pdf; CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., COLLEcrING CONSUMER
DEBTS: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE (2007); Fox & WOODALL, supra note 2;
AMANDA QUESTER & JEAN ANN Fox, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING & CONSUMER
FED'N OF AM., CAR TITLE LENDING: DRIVING BORROWERS TO FINANCIAL RUIN
(2005), available at http://www.responsiblelending.orglpdfs/rr008-Car_1itle_Lending
0405.pdf; Wu & Fox, supra note 4.
27. Paul Chessin, Borrowing from Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado's Deferred Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 406-07 (2005).
28. Id. at 405.
29. Id. at 406.
30. Id. at 406-07.
31. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACfICES DI
RECfED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR FAMILIES 12 (2006).
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period as whites ... , and that, after controlling for [many] socio
economic characteristics, [African Americans] were five times
more likely than whites to take out multiple payday loans. 32

The same study found that payday lenders clustered in working
class neighborhoods and disproportionately favored neighborhoods
with high minority populations. 33
Texan payday loan borrowers are disproportionately African
American and Hispanic, according to an academic study based an
on analysis of a database of 145,000 payday loan applicants from
2000 to 2004 from a "large payday and pawn lender" in Texas. 34
While only 11.5% of Texas adults are African American,35 they re
present 43% of payday loan borrowers.36 Despite lower bank ac
count ownership by Hispanic families (24 % nationally are
unbanked compared to 10% for the population as a whole),37 34%
of payday loan borrowers were Hispanic, compared to 29% of
Texas adults.38 The Texas study also found that 62% of borrowers
were female and that the median annual pay was $18,540, compared
to census data for median annual pay in Texas of $19,617. 39 Only
34% of Texas payday loan borrowers owned their own home. 40
B.

Check Cashers

A 2005 survey of more than two thousand representative con
sumers found that the unbanked were more likely to be lower-in
come and minority consumers. They were also more likely to use
fringe financial services. About one-in-seven (14.9%) consumers
earning under $40,000 annually had no bank account, whereas
fewer than one-in-twenty (4.3%) consumers earning more than
$40,000 were unbanked. African American and Latino consumers
were significantly more likely to be unbanked than white consum
32. Michael A. Stegman, Payday Lending, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 169, 174 (2007).
33. Id.
34. PAIGE MARTA SKIBA & JEREMY TOBACMAN, MEASURING THE INDIVIDUAL
LEVEL EFFECTS OF ACCESS TO CREDIT: EVIDENCE FROM PAYDAY LOANS tbl.1 (2007),
available at http://pskiba.googlepages.comiSkibaJMPaper.pdf.
35. U.S. Census Bureau, Texas-DP-l. Profile of General Demographic Changes:
2000, http://www.census.gov/census2000/states/tx.html(follow "General Demographic
Characteristics (DP-1)" hyperlink) (last visited June 30, 2007).
36. SKIBA & TOBACMAN, supra note 34, at tbl.l.
37. Maude Toussaint-Comeau, Changing Hispanic Demographics: Opportunities
and Constraints in the Financial Market, CHI. FED. LETTER, Aug. 2003, at 2-3, available
at http://www.chicagofed.orglpublications/fedletter/2003/cflaug2003_192.pdf.
38. SKIBA & TOBACMAN, supra note 34, at tbl.l.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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ers. Nearly one-in-five (19.5%) African American consumers and
one-in-seven (15.1 %) Latino consumers were unbanked, compared
to about one-in-twelve (7.5%) white consumers that were un
banked. Consumers with lower levels of education and consumers
with blue-collar or service-sector jobs were more likely to be un
banked than those with higher levels of education and those with
white-collar jobs. About one-eighth (13.0%) of blue-collar and ser
vice-sector workers were unbanked compared to one-twentieth
(4.8%) of white-collar employees. Only one-in-thirty (3.3%) con
sumers with college degrees or more education were unbanked
compared to about one-seventh (15.7%) of those with high school
education or less.
Many consumers without bank accounts rely on check-cashing
outlets to facilitate financial transactions. 41 The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency conducted a survey of lower-income,
inner-city consumers and found that check cashing and money or
der purchases were significant transactions for the unbanked and
that check cashers were market leaders in providing these ser
vices. 42 The' survey found that about three-fifths (59%) of all un
banked consumers used check cashers for some financial services
transactions and nearly three-quarters (71 %) of the unbanked who
received payroll or benefit checks used check cashers. 43 Minorities
are overrepresented in the population that frequents check cashers;
one national check-cashing firm estimates that 25% of its customers
are Latino and 20% are African American. 44
C.

Refund Anticipation Loans

RALs are mostly used by low-income taxpayers. According to
IRS data, 83% of RAL applicants in 2005 had adjusted gross in
comes of $35,000 or less. 45 This is consistent with statistics from the
country's largest tax preparation services. At H&R Block, 57% of
41. Constance R. Dunham, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, The Role
of Banks and Nonbanks in Servicing Low- and Moderate-Income Communities, in
CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A FEDERAL RE·
SERVE SYSTEM RESEARCH CONFERENCE 31, 31 (Jackson L. Blanton, Sherri L.W. Rhine
& Alicia Williams eds., 2001), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/
cfmacd_conference_book.pdf.
42. /d. at 32.
43. Id. at 36.
44. Ace Cash Express, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 9 (June 30, 2006),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dsvrp.vgHg.htm#_102.
45. Data from IRS SPEC, Return Information Database for Tax Year 2004 (Re
turns Filed in 2005), Nov. 2006 [hereinafter Data from IRS SPEC 2004].
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their customers make less than $30,000 annually.46 Jackson Hewitt
similarly reports that 73 % of its customers make less than $30,000
annually,47 and HBSC states that the majority of its RAL customers
have an average household income of $17,800. 48 A 2005 national
poll by CFA found that the majority of RAL borrowers (58.7%)
earned below $40,000. 49
RALs seriously impact the working poor who qualify for the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). IRS data show that in 2005, 5.9
million (over 60%) families of RAL consumers were EITC recipi
ents. 50 Yet, that year, EITC recipients made up only 17% of indi
vidual taxpayers. 51 In addition, IRS data show that 30% of EITC
recipients applied for a RAL in 2005. 52 Thus, EITC recipients are
vastly overrepresented among the ranks of RAL consumers.
D.

Car Title Loans

According to reports from regulators, consumers who borrow
against titles to their vehicles are low income earners. 53 Missouri's
auditor reported that 70% of payday and title loan customers
earned less than $25,000 per year. 54 In 1999, Illinois title loan users
had average annual salaries of less than $20,000, according to a De
partment of Financial Institutions study. 55 In addition, New Mexico
46. David T. Rose, et aI., H&R Block's Refund Anticipation Loans: Perilous Prof
its and the Bottom of the Pyramid, in BUSINESS SOLUTIONS FOR THE GLOBAL POOR:
CREATING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC VALUE 349, 349 (V. Kasturi Rangan, John A.
Quelch, Gustavo Herrero & Brooke Barton eds., 2007), available at http://www.people.
hbs.edu/ptufano/Rose,%20Schneider, %20Tufano%20March %201 %202006.pdf.
47. JACKSON HEWITT, TAX SERVICES INC., FINAL PROSPEcrUS 46 (2004), availa
ble at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1283552/000119312504106600/d424b1.
htm.
48. Household International, Inc., Annual Report (Form lO-K), at 7 (2003), avail
able at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/354964/000095013704001324/c82697e1
Ovk.htm.
49. CHI CHI Wu, JEAN ANN Fox & PATRICK WOODALL, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CTR. & CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., ANOTHER YEAR OF LOSSES: HIGH-PRICED REFUND
ANTICIPATION LOANS CONTINUE TO TAKE A CHUNK OUT OF AMERICANS' TAX RE
FUNDS 12 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.orglpdfs/2006_RAL_report.pdf.
50. See Wu & Fox, supra note 4, at 11 n.49.
51. See id. at 11 n.50.
52. Data from IRS SPEC 2004, supra note 45.
53. See, e.g., CLAIRE MCCASKILL, DIV. OF FIN. & REGULATION OF INSTANT
LoAN INDUS., Mo. OFFlCE OF STATE AUDITOR, REPORT No. 2001-36, at 3 (2001) [here
inafter Mo. OFFICE OF STATE AUDITOR REPORT], available at http://auditor.mo.gov/
press/2001-36.htm; ILL. DEP'T. OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT TERM LENDING REPORT 26
(1999); N.M. FIN. INST. DIV., SUMMARY OF TITLE LoANS (2004) (on file with author).
54. Mo. OFFlCE OF STATE AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 53.
55. ILL. DEP'T. OF FIN. INSTS., supra note 53.
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regulators report that the average income of title loan borrowers, as
reported by licensees for 2004, was $21,818. 56
IV.

IN MOST STATES, LAWS FAIL TO PROTECT USERS OF
FRINGE BANKING SERVICES

At the state and federal level, fringe financial services are inad
equately regulated to provide necessary protections to vulnerable
consumers. While payday and title loans are subject to general fed
eral credit laws, such as the Truth in Lending Act,57 only military
service members are protected from loans secured by personal
checks, debit authorization, or vehicle titles under the John Warner
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which
took effect on October 1, 2007. 58
Payday and title lenders operate either under safe harbor laws
that permit loans at costs higher than usury or exempt them from
small loan rate caps, or they operate in states with deregulated
small loan rates. Payday loans based on checks held for future de
posit are legal in thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia,
but are prohibited in states where a quarter of the United States'
population lives. 59
As previously mentioned, car title loans are legal in about half
the states, either through deregulated rates for licensed lenders or
special legislation that permits triple-digit annual rates for title
secured 10ans.60 In Iowa, Kansas, and Virginia, title lenders exploit
legal loopholes to charge unlimited fees for open-end title loans,
while title lenders in Georgia and Alabama operate under pawn
laws. 61 In the sixteen states that specifically authorize title lending,
only three states cap rates at double-digit levels (Florida, Kentucky,
and Minnesota) while six states permit charges that result in annual
percentage rates of 204% to 300% APR for a $500 one-month
loan. 62
56. N.M. FIN. INST. DIV., supra note 53.
57. Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, tit. 1,82 Stat. 146 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.c. §§ 1601-1693 (2000».
58. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub.
L. No. 109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083, 2269 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.c. § 987».
59. See Consumer Fed. of Am., Legal Status of Payday Lending by State, http://
www.paydayloaninfo.orgllstatus.cfm (last visited June 30, 2007).
60. Fox & GUY, supra note 9, at 7, 21; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 8-9, 21 app. B.
62. Id.
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RALs are made by banks that export deregulated interest rates
from their home states. 63 State efforts to regulate RAL facilitators
has happened in only ten states and these typically do not cap rates
charged for loans. 64 "With the exception of Connecticut, these laws
primarily rely on disclosures to protect consumers from RAL
abuses."65 Connecticut's 60% rate cap, as applied to facilitators of
RALs, is being challenged in court by Santa Barbara Bank & Trust.
Whether a state can regulate RAL facilitators remains unclear. 66
State regulations barely protect consumers who use check
cashing services. 67 Check cas hers are licensed in the majority of
states but only half of the states cap fees charged to cash certain
types of checks. 68 Those caps are usually set too high to restrain
fees. For example, Indiana permits check cashers to charge 10% of
the face value of the check. 69 Newer products, such as prepaid
debit cards, are offered with virtually no consumer protections.1° It
is unclear whether, and to what extent, federal protections that ap
ply to debit cards tied to bank accounts also cover consumers who
use these cards in place of a bank account. 71 The Federal Reserve
expanded Regulation E, which implements the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act to cover stored value cards used to hold payroll depos
its, effective in 2007.12 However, the Federal Reserve has not ex
plicitly extended Regulation E protections to cards used as bank
account substitutes. 73
To protect low- to moderate-income consumers in the fringe
financial services market, states should either preserve their small
loan rate caps or usury laws or reinstitute meaningful protections
against rate gouging by lenders subject to state regulation. A typi
cal state small loan rate cap is thirty-six percent annual interest, the
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same maximum loan rate enacted by Congress in 2006 to protect
active duty service members and their families.1 4
States should repeal payday loan authorization laws and pro
hibit lending based on checks or required authorization to debit
bank accounts as security for a loan. States should not condone
soliciting consumers to deliberately write unfunded checks. While
the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act prohibits conditioning the
extension of periodic payment credit on electronic payment, single
payment loans secured by debit authorization are exploited by
storefront and online payday lenders.75
States should maintain or reestablish requirements for licensed
lenders to structure small loans with affordable repayment sched
ules and base loan decisions on the borrower's ability to repay.
Consumers are less likely to become mired in unaffordable debt if
loans can be repaid over time without breaking the family budget.
Expensive loans made to people with little chance of repayment,
but with valuable assets to be seized, are inherently predatory.
State and federal enforcement should curtail deceptive and un
fair practices and coercive debt-collection practices that are charac
teristic of lenders that use sham transactions and ruses to evade
consumer protections or to trick borrowers. States should apply the
provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to lend
ers collecting their own debts.1 6
To safeguard the working poor, Congress should prohibit
EITC-secured lending and terminate IRS services that facilitate
RALs. Instead of loaning money for a few days to be repaid by the
IRS using direct deposit of tax refunds, consumer and community
groups should support faster delivery of tax refunds and banking
the unbanked.
States should license and supervise check-cashing outlets in or
der to protect consumers and better insure compliance with money
transfer requirements. CFA recommends that state check-cashing
laws cap fees for public benefit and paychecks at low rates. States
should use the AARP model check casher act as a template for
strong regulation, low fee caps, clear disclosures, and prevention of
payday lending by check cashers. 77
74.
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Federal laws that protect credit and debit card users should be
extended to cover new forms of payment devices and cards mar
keted to consumers at fringe financial services companies. Protec
tions should include liability limits for unauthorized use, recourse
for errors or malfunctioning cards, and clear cost disclosures. CFA
also recommends that Congress enact shorter bank check deposit
hold periods and reform overdraft fees and practices to make it
safer for consumers to use the services of federally insured deposi
tory institutions.
CONCLUSION

Communities can take action to improve the financial services
market for working families. Local governments across the country
are using zoning and local ordinances in an effort to stem the tide of
check-cashing outlets, pawn shops, and payday loan outlets in low
and moderate-income neighborhoods. Zoning is being used to thin
out payday loan density. In fact, San Francisco has declared a mor
atorium on additional check-cashing or payday loan outlets.
Nonprofit groups, employers, and financial institutions can join
America Saves, a CFA-Ied social marketing campaign, to encourage
low- and moderate-income consumers to become savers. 78 Studies
reviewed by CFA find that low-income families with at least $500 in
emergency savings are eight times less likely to use a payday loan as
a family making $25,000 per year with no savings. One of the most
popular goals for new America Savers is to build up an emergency
savings fund to buffer their families from unexpected expenses or
gaps in income.79
Bringing unbanked consumers into financial mainstream is an
important step forward but must be done carefully in order to avoid
financial hardships. A family can save the hundreds of dollars it
now pays for cashing checks, buying money orders, and paying bills
by using a checking account at a credit union or bank, but only if
the account is well designed for a low-balance customer. The Cali
fornia Reinvestment Coalition advocates that banks offer their "Es
sential Bank Account," designed as a gateway into the financial
mainstream. 8o This account comes with free money orders in lieu
78. For more information, see America Saves, http://www.AmericaSaves.org (last
visited June 30, 2007).
79. America Saves, The Importance of Emergency Savings, http://www.America
Saves.org/strategies/emergencies.asp (last visited June 30, 2007).
80. Cal. Reinvestment Coal., Positive Financial Options, http://www.calreinvest.
orglbanking-insurance/positive-financial-options (last visited June 30, 2007).
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of checks, cannot be overdrawn, and is free or low cost. California
Reinvestment Coalition recommends direct deposit to get fast ac
cess to paychecks and unlimited ATM use. S1
Community nonprofit tax preparation programs save the work
ing poor the cost of commercial tax preparation and bypass the
marketing of quick tax loans that divert antipoverty funds into the
coffers of big banks and tax preparation firms. Mayors across the
country recognize the importance of EITC dollars flowing into their
cities for economic development for both cities and families.
Fringe "bankers" will remain financial predators as long as state
and federal consumer protection laws fail to provide protections at
least as effective as those enjoyed by affluent consumers using main
stream products. Rate caps and usury laws are essential for re
straining high-cost credit when borrowers lack sufficient market clout
to drive down the cost of borrowing. Some credit products should be
banned as unsafe for consumers, including loans based on access to
the borrower's bank account, car title, or EITC delivered through tax
refunds. Fee-for-service transactions and products can become the
new "financial services model" with the right combination of fea
tures, protections, promotion, and information.

81. Id. For more information, see California Reinvestment Coalition, http://www.
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